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ROE v. WADE--THE ABORTION DECISION-
AN ANALYSIS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
In January of 1973, in two companion cases,1 the Supreme Court
invalidated abortion statutes that were typical of the legislation
in effect in mist of the country.2 Without addressing the pros and
cons of abortion per se, this comment will examine the substantive
due process and the right to privacy analysis employed by the
court in Roe v. Wade and consider the implications of the deci-
sion in related areas.
BACKGROUND OF SuBsTANTIVE DUE PRocEss
There have been two lines of cases in the development of sub-
stantive due process.3 One line of cases was concerned primarily
with economic and social welfare legislation.4 In the early part of
the century, the Supreme Court frequently struck down such leg-
islation, primarily because of its disagreement with the ends the
legislatures sought to achieve.5 However, beginning in 1934 with
Nebbia v. New York, 6 the Court changed its approach and began
upholding socio-economic legislation. The Court adopted a defer-
ential attitude towards possible legislative purposes and the exist-
ence of a rational relationship of the statute to the end being
sought by the legislature.7 Insofar as socio-economic legislation is
concerned, this attitude still prevails on the court. At the same
time, a second line of cases developed in which substantive due
process was utilized in upholding individual and private rights
against infringement by the state." The early cases were typified
1. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973). Doe v. Bolton, 93 S. Ct. 739
(1973).
2. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 709, 720 (1973).
3. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 McH. L. Rnv.
219, 223 (1965).
4. Id.
5. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
6. 291U.S. 502 (1934).
7. Id.
8. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MicH. L.Rsv. 219,
223 (1965).
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by Meyer v. Nebraska,9 in which the Court invalidated a state stat-
ute that prohibited the teaching of a foreign language to pupils
who had not passed the eighth grade, and by Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,'0 in which a statute that prevented the operation of private
schools was ruled unconstitutional. A recent example was the
Griswold v. Connecticut case," in which a state law that prohib-
ited the use of contraceptives by married persons was struck down
as violative of a constitutionally protected right to marital privacy.
While only one justice among the majority chose to ground his
decision explicitly in due process terms,12 the opinions of five of the
majority exemplify the substantive due process approach. 13 In
these private "fundamental" rights cases, the Court shows far less
deference towards the legislative purpose than it does in the socio-
economic legislation cases. In the former, the statute must not only
bear a rational relation to the purpose, but the state interest must
be "compelling" enough to outweigh any infringement upon the
"fundamental" rights.'4
THE ABORTION DECISION
In Doe v. Bolton,15 the Supreme Court invalidated a statute
that was patterned after the American Law Institute's Model Pe-
nal Code, which served as a model for recent legislation in about
one-fourth of the states.' 6 Certain of the procedural require-
ments for obtaining an abortion were ruled in violation of proce-
dural due process, and a residency requirement was held to be in
violation of the privileges and immunities clause.
This comment, however, is concerned primarily with the Wade
decision. Wade involved the Texas criminal abortion statute 7
which prohibited all abortions except those that were performed to
save the life of the mother.' s The Court held that the statute was
9. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
10. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12. Id. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
13. Note, Unenumerated Rights-Substantive Due Process, The Ninth
Amendment, and John Stuart Mill, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 922, 926.
14. E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). While this is an equal pro-
tection case, the same "weighing" process is utilized.
15. 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973).
16. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, n.37 (1973).
17. 93 S. Ct. 705 at n.1.
18. This type of statute is in effect in the majority of the states. For a
listing of the states see 93 S. Ct. 705 at n.2.
unconstitutional because it violated a pregnant woman's right of
privacy as founded in the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. This right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."'19
The court acknowledged that there were two legitimate legisla-
tive purposes involved that might justify such a statute.20  One is
to protect the health of the mother by prohibiting a danger-
ous medical procedure; the other is to protect the fetus's right to
life.21 The court found that, because abortion is now safer than
childbirth through the first trimester of pregnancy, there is no
rational relation between prohibiting abortions and protecting
the mother's health. Consequently, no regulation of abortions,
other than the usual regulation of medical services, is permissible
during this period. Beyond that time, as the danger of abortion
increases relative to childbirth, the state interest in and justifica-
tion for regulation of abortions increases.
The court held that the second state purpose, that of protecting
the fetus's right to life, is not "compelling" until the point of vi-
ability is reached. 22 Only after this time is the legislative purpose
strong enough to permit proscription of all abortions. Even af-
ter viability, the state must except the situation where abortion
is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.23
ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORIT OPINION
The majority 24 unhesitatingly based their decision on a substan-
tive due process test and rationale. The classic substantive due
process test is whether there is a rational relationship between the
law and a valid legislative objective.25
[T]he law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and
... the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation
to the object sought to be attained. 26
19. 93 S. Ct. at 727.
20. 93 S. Ct. at 724, 725.
21. A third possible justification, to discourage illicit sexual conduct,
was not advanced by the state. 93 S. Ct. at 724.
22. 93 S. Ct. at 732. The court described viability as the point in time
when the fetus presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside
the mother's womb.
23. 93 S. Ct. at 732.
24. Blackmun, J., wrote the opinion in which Burger, C.T., and Douglas,
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Powell joined. Burger, C.J., and Douglas
and Stewart, JJ., filed concurring opinions. White, J. filed a dissenting
opinion in which Rehnquist, J., joined, and Rehnquist, 3., filed a dissent-
ing opinion.
25. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
26. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
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Where legislation burdens "fundamental" individual rights, there
must be a "compelling state interest" to outweigh the burden be-
fore the statute will be validated.17 Where there is a rational rela-
tionship between the statute and the legislative purpose, and when
the burden upon individual rights is outweighed by the state in-
terest, the statute will stand.
Legislative Purpose of Protecting the Mother's Health
In Wade, the Court found that the state's concern for the moth-
er's health was a legitimate objective of the abortion statute.28
However, subsequent to the enactment of the statute, abortion
techniques had improved to the point that an abortion performed
in the first trimester of pregnancy was safer than childbirth.
29
As a result of this development, there was no longer a rational re-
lation between the statute and the purpose of protecting the moth-
er's health. The rational relation is not reestablished until about
the end of the third month of pregnancy when the respective mor-
tality rates equalize. The Court held, therefore, that during the
first trimester the abortion decision must be left strictly to the
pregnant woman and her physician. 30 Only after the first three
months may the legislature regulate abortions in furtherance of
protecting the mother's health.31
It would apparently follow from the reasoning in Wade that fur-
ther changes in medical techniques could constitutionally disable
legislatures from prohibiting abortions in furtherance of a legis-
lative purpose of protecting a mother's health. This would be so
if abortion performed at any stage involved less risk to the mother
27. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to
vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 642 (1969) (right of interstate travel);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (freedom to marry); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 503 (1965) (right to marital privacy); Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (denial of right to take Bar Exam
for arbitrary reasons); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (steriliza-
tion of "habitual criminals"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (right of parents to direct the education of their children, right to
carry on a business); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to teach
or learn a foreign language).
28. 93 S. Ct. at 725.
29. Id.
30. 93 S. Ct. at 732.
31. Id.
than does childbirth. In such a situation, there would no longer
be a rational relationship between this legislative purpose and a
statute prohibiting abortions. Conversely, if the mortality rate of
mothers in childbirth decreases so that childbirth is safer than
abortions performed at any stage of pregnancy, then the rational
relationship would exist. Thus, the practical effect of the Court's
analysis of this legislative purpose is to render this aspect of the
constitutional test of abortion statutes a function of a potentially
variable technological standard. The abortion statute that is con-
stitutional today may become unconstitutional tomorrow as a re-
sult of changes in medical techniques.8 2
Legislative Purpose of Protecting the Fetus's Right to Life
The second legislative purpose the court acknowledged as legiti-
mate was the protection of the fetus's right to life.83 Obviously,
there is a high degree of correlation between the statute and this
purpose. The life of the fetus is best protected by prohibiting its
intentional destruction. Only the exception to prevent jeopardiz-
ing the mother's life prevents reaching a 100% correlation.
Due process further requires that the legislative purpose out-
weigh the burden imposed upon any disfavored class. 34 In the case
of abortion statutes, the burden falls upon pregnant women in
that they are denied the right to terminate a pregnancy and thus
exercise a certain amount of control over their own bodies.
The decision facing the Court was, therefore, whether the fetus's
right to life outweighed the mother's right to control her body,
i.e., whether the right to life outweighs the right to privacy. It
seems improbable that any would deny that it does. However, the
Supreme Court did hold the abortion law to be an unconstitutional
infringement upon the woman's right to privacy.
Since there is a rational relation between the statute and the leg-
islative purpose, and assuming that the court did not mean to say
that the right to privacy outweighs the right to life, the Court must
have based its holding upon an analysis of the legislative purpose
per se. The correctness of the legislature's characterization of its
purpose as protecting the fetus's right to life depends upon its de-
cision that human life begins at conception. This question of when
human life begins is an abstract, discretionary question in the
32. See Werthheimer, Understanding the Abortion Argument, 1 Pmioso-
PHY AND PuBLIc AFFAIRS 67, 82 (1971).
33. 93 S.Ct. at 725.
34. See note 27 supra.
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sense that it is not something that is empirically measurable, but
is primarily a function of how one defines human life. Whether
one defines human life as beginning at conception, at viability,
or at birth depends ultimately upon a value preference.
[W]here the goal is such that the choice/goal relation depends ul-
timately not upon an empirical claim but upon a value preference,
legislative satisfaction with the relation will ordinarily be deferred
to, by calling the judgment discretionary.35
[The courts] will intervene when the factual claim, on which the
relation between choice and goal necessarily depends, is outside the
realm of empirical plausibility.36
In the context of this case, the judicial inquiry should have
been whether there was any way that the legislature could have
rationally concluded, as a basis for the abortion legislation, that
human life begins at conception and is therefore worthy of protec-
tion from that point in time. The Court seemed to recognize this
analytic principle when it stated:
Logically, of course, a legitimate state interest in this area need not
stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins at concep-
tion or at some other point prior to live birth.37
However, in the very next sentence, the court said:
In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be given to the
less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved,
the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the preg-
nant woman alone.38
Thereafter, the court referred to the legislative purpose as pro-
tection of the potentiality of human life. By describing the fe-
tus as only potential life, the court implicitly rejected the legisla-
ture's value judgment that human life, at conception, is actual,
and not merely potential.
While the court said they did not need to "resolve the difficult
question of when life begins",8 9 they appear to have done that very
thing when they held that:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so
35. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1241 (1970).
36. Id.
37. 93 S. Ct. at 725.
38. Id.
39. 93 S. Ct. at 730.
because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaning-
ful life outside the mother's womb.... If the State is interested
in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to pro-
scribe abortion during that period except when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother.40
It appears that the court has not only rejected the legislative
value judgment but has substituted one of its own. The court
has, in effect, said that at viability potential human life becomes
so potential that it overrides the woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy, which is another way of saying that human life begins
at viability.
The difficulty with the Wade decision lies in determining upon
what rationale or method of analysis the Court based its decision as
to the beginning of human life. It has been suggested elsewhere
"that the courts have sometimes admitted the (necessary) ration-
ality of statutes, but have used various doctrines and devices to
avoid the conclusion that the statute is therefore constitutional un-
der the rationality test. .... 41 These devices can best be de-
scribed as (1) ignoring a legislative purpose, (2) manipulating the
level of abstraction at which the purpose is defined, and (3) eval-
uating the purpose as a unit rather than as a mix of policies.42
These devices are in contrast to what would seem to be a desirable
method of analysis; that is, to evaluate the legislative goal that is
suggested by the statutory terms. 43 In Wade, the Court appears to
have utilized a combination of these devices. The state asserted,
and the statutory terms do not contradict the assertion, that the
legislative goal was to protect human life itself,44 yet without ex-
plaining why, the Court apparently redefined the goal to be the
protection of potential life, thereby avoiding upholding a rational
statute. It is, of course, possible that the Court's redefinition of the
legislative goal was based on a belief that the legislative decision
that human life begins at conception is irrational per se. This is
hardly a supportable position for the Court to take, however, and,
indeed, the Court did not advance any reasoning in support of such
a position.
What the Court does seem to have said is that the question of
when life begins is an extremely unsettled and controversial issue,
40. 93 S. Ct. at 732.
41. Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE
L.J. 123, 132 (1972).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. TEXAs PENAL CODE § 1191 (Vernon 1961) states: '"By "abortion" is
meant that the life of the fetus or embryo shall be destroyed in the
woman's womb ...." (emphasis added).
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and for that reason alone, any legislative purpose that is based on
a purported resolution of the issue is irrational.
Texas urges that life begins at conception .... We need not re-
solve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained
in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology
are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary ... is not
in a position to speculate as to the answer.45
The Court then discussed the divergent views on the issue and con-
tinued:
In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory
of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that
are at stake.4 6
If the court has indeed held that the legislative purpose is ir-
rational because it is controversial, then in any case the state would
have the burden of justifying its statute by demonstrating a lack of
controversy over its legislative decision rather than by merely
advancing a rational basis for it. This is an extremely strict re-
quirement that affords the judiciary a powerful weapon to use
against legislation that it finds offensive in some manner, for few
issues that reach the Supreme Court are demonstrably non-con-
troversial.
IMPLICATIONS OF A "CoNTRovERSIAL PuRPosE TEST"
Abortion
In the Wade decision, the Court said that "[f] or the stage prior to
approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision
and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman's attending physician."47  Elsewhere, however,
the Court spoke in terms of the right to privacy as being broad
enough to include the woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy, stressing such factors as psychological harm
to the mother, the distress associated with an unwanted child, and
the stigma of unwed motherhood.48 Realistically then, since such
social factors (as oppposed to strictly medical factors) may be a
basis for an abortion, the actual abortion decision is one that must
45. 93 S. Ct. at 730.
46. 93 S. Ct. at 731.
47. 93 S. Ct. at 732.
48. 93 S. Ct. at 727.
be resolved according to the dictates of the individual mother's
conscience.
Because the definition of human life is so controversial that the
abortion decision during the first three months is one that must
be left to one's conscience, free of interference by the state,49 it
might follow that one who opposes abortion as murder should be
able to act affirmatively and forcefully to prevent abortions from
being effectuated. It would seem that by constitutionally disabling
the legislatures from regulating an area because it is controversial
and should be left to the dictates of one's conscience, the Supreme
Court has painted itself into an anarchical corner. Obviously, such
a result (the allowing of anti-abortionists to forcefully prevent
abortions by others) will not be sanctioned by the Court, but to
avoid it, at least insofar as the right to defend the lives of oth-
ers is concerned, would require reasoning inconsistent with the
"controversial issue" test.
Euthanasia and Suicide
Euthanasia and suicide are similar to abortion in the issues
raised and the current controversy5" surrounding the topics.51 The
context in which euthanasia is usually debated is where a patient
is in the terminal stage of a fatal illness and voluntarily requests
another person to end the patient's life. It is often indistinguish-
able from suicide except that an "accomplice" is involved. An
even more controversial situation is where the patient is uncon-
scious or for some other reason mentally incapable of requesting
or giving his consent to being killed. In both voluntary and in-
voluntary euthanasia, the killing may be accomplished by an act
of omission, such as failing to continue medication, or an act of
commission, such as giving a fatal overdose of a drug.
Voluntary euthanasia and suicide are similar in the issues
raised and the illegality accompanying the act.52 It seems likely
49. 93 S. Ct. at 732.
50. Time Magazine, March 5, 1973 at 70.
51. Williams, Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U. COL. L.R. 178 (1966). See
also Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal,
44 IND. L.J. 539 (1969); Louisell, Abortion, the Practice of Medicine and
the Due Process of Law, 16 UCLA L. Rsv. 233 (1969); Morris, Voluntary
Euthanasia, 45 WASH. L. REv. 239 (1970); Comment, Legal Aspects of Eu-
thanasia, 36 ALBANY L. REv. 674 (1972); Comment, The Right to Die, 7
HOUSTON L. REV. 654 (1970); Note, Euthanasia, The Individual's Right to
Freedom of Choice, 5 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 190 (1972).
52. Gurney, Is There a Right to Die?-A Study of the Law vf Eu-
thanasia, 3 Cu m R AD-SSAFom L. REv. 235, 238 (1972).
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that both could be constitutionally protected from state inter-
ference under the due process rationale of the Wade decision. The
right to be protected in both instances is the patient's right of
privacy to control his own body, including the right to decide
whether or not to continue living in it, i.e., the right not to be
forced to continue living against one's will. The legislative pur-
pose in preventing euthanasia and suicide could be described as the
implementation of society's concern for the security and preserva-
tion of human life.53
The key to the overriding right of privacy in the abortion deci-
sion was the Court's conclusion that a legislature cannot ration-
ally find a fetus to be human life deserving of protection because
the issue is unsettled and controversial. The Court spoke of a pro-
tectible fetus in terms of a "meaningful life".54 It seems equally
controversial whether a life of pain, with an expectation of an
agonizing death, or a life of unbearable mental torment is "mean-
ingful". It would appear that a legislative purpose of protecting
such a life would be as "irrational" as was the legislative decision
to protect all fetal life irregardless of its stage of development. In
addition, the countervailing "fundamental" right to control one's
own body, in the ultimate sense of controlling one's life or death,
must be at least as protectible as the right to decide whether to con-
tinue with or terminate a pregnancy. By the Wade analysis, it
appears likely that state interference with voluntary euthanasia or
suicide is an impermissible violation of the right to privacy.
A more difficult question is presented in involuntary euthanasia
cases. While many commentators favor voluntary euthanasia, few
favor involuntary euthanasia. 55 In voluntary euthanasia cases,
the conflict between the legislative goal and the individual's right
to privacy involves but one person. In involuntary euthanasia,
however, the respective interests are those of separate persons. For
that reason, the legislative goal in preventing involuntary euthana-
sia could be said to be two-fold: (1) implementation of society's
concern for the security and preservation of human life in general
53. Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal,
44 IND. L.J. 539, 545 (1969).
54. 93 S. Ct. at 732.
55. Note, Euthanasia-The Individual's Right to Freedom of Choice, 5
SuFFoLK U.L. REV. 190 (1972).
and (2) protection of the life of the particular person threatened by
involuntary euthanasia, i.e., those unable to protect themselves.
In the context of involuntary euthanasia, as in the abortion con-
text, the right to privacy to be protected is that of a third person
who is charged with the care of the potential victim. In the abor-
tion case, the right of privacy is the mother's. In the involuntary
euthanasia case, the right of privacy is that of the spouse of a ter-
minally ill cancer patient, or the parent of a monsterously de-
formed or retarded infant, or the children of an aging and badly
suffering parent. The right, however, may not be as strong in
the involuntary euthanasia case as in abortion, for it does not in-
volve control over one's own body in a physical sense. Rather,
it involves a more general right of privacy, freedom from the psy-
chological and physical stress imposed upon one charged with the
care of the incapacitated person. The Wade opinion, however, in-
discussing the detriment imposed upon a pregnant woman by de-
nying her an abortion, stressed these very factors.50 Further-
more, as mentioned above, the Court spoke of a protectible fetus in
terms of a "meaningful life". While it is unclear exactly what the
Court meant by this, the explanation could lie in the only ascertain-
able difference between a viable and non-viable fetus, that is, the
ability to survive outside of the mother's body. Once the non-vi-
able fetus is removed from the mother, it has no further expecta-
tion of life. In the same sense, it could be said that one who is in
an acute and terminal stage of an illness with no real hope of re-
covery has no further expectation of life. If that is so, then that per-
son's life could be said to be lacking in the "meaningful" qualities
that renders a viable fetus protectible.
Just as consent of the fetus was irrelevant in the abortion ra-
tionale, consent of the patient may very well be irrelevant in an in-
voluntary euthanasia case. On the other hand, the Court might
choose to recognize that the patient has a right to privacy or a
right to life such that without the patient's consent, the state
could not demonstrate a compelling interest in allowing the kill-
ing of the patient merely by showing the burden that would be im-
posed upon another by allowing the patient to live. Disregard-
ing such complications, though, the question, as in the abortion
case, is whether the legislature can rationally decide to protect the
life of the patient, and in so doing, infringe upon a right of pri-
vacy of another. Since the "meaningfulness" of the patient's life is
analogous to the non-viable fetus's life, and the issue is highly con-
troversial, the legislative purpose may well be "irrational".
56. 93 S. Ct. at 727.
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A SiDE IssuE IN THE ABORTION CASE
In arriving at its conclusions, the Court discussed an issue col-
lateral to the central issue in the case, i.e., whether the legislature
could rationally conclude that the fetus is a human life. The Court
considered whether or not a fetus is a "person" in the constitu-
tional sense, such as to be deserving of equal protection from the
state under the fourteenth amendment.57 The opinion referred to
various places in the constitution where the word "person" was
used,"s e.g., in the apportionment clause, and concluded that, in
those usages, the word had only post-natal application. The Court
decided, therefore, that within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment, the word "person" does not include the unborn.
The Court's argument on this issue apparently assumes that, for
example, because a fetus is not counted in a census for the purpose
of determining the number of "persons" for apportionment reasons,
that a fetus should also be excluded from the meaning of the
word "person" in determining to whom the protection of the four-
teenth amendment extends. The Court seems to be saying that,
because a word is narrowly defined in the context of a practical
application (census taking) due to the impracticability or sus-
ceptibility to large error of including fetuses within the meaning
of the term, that it should also be narrowly defined, to the exclu-
sion of an entire class of potential "persons", when determining
what persons are deserving of constitutional protection of the
right to life.
The meaning of "person" in the fourteenth amendment would be
determinative if an abortion statute were being attacked by a
representative of unborn children as a deprivation of life without
due process of law and a denial of equal protection in violation of
the fourteenth amendment.59 But where, as in Wade, a restric-
tive abortion statute is attacked as violative of the mother's right
to privacy, the decision does not turn on whether abortion is a de-
nial of due process to the fetus. If abortion is a violation of the fe-
tus's fourteenth amendment rights, then an anti-abortion statute
57. 93 S. Ct. at 728-730.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Byrn v. N.Y. City Health & Hospital Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194,
286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972), motion to expedite consideration
denied, 409 U.S. 821.
would, of course, be constitutional. But even if such a statute is
not compelled by the fourteenth amendment, it might still be valid,
depending upon the rationality of the legislative definition of the
concept of human life.
CONCLfUSION
In its analysis of the abortion issue, the Wade decision consid-
ered the legislative purposes of protecting the mother's health and
protecting the fetus's right to life and weighed these purposes
against the infringement upon the mother's right to the privacy
of controlling her own body. Insofar as the purpose of protecting
the mother's health was deemed irrational so long as abortion is
safer than childbirth, the rationality of this legislative purpose
varies with changes in the respective mortality rates of abortion
and childbirth. The purpose of protecting the life of a fetus, which
rests upon a legislative definition of human life as beginning at
conception, appears to be irrational because the correctness of
that definition is a controversial and highly debatable issue. The
Court, in effect, redefined protectible human life as beginning at vi-
ability, because apparently, in the mind of the Supreme Court, this
is a less controversial definition. An extrapolation of this princi-
ple, that a legislative purpose is irrational because it is controver-
sial, to the context of euthanasia and suicide indicates the possibil-
ity that legislative prohibition of the killing of humans in those
contexts may well be constitutionally impermissible as violative
of substantive due process rights of privacy. While this would be
a highly unsatisfactory result, it is arguably consistent with
the analysis in Wade.
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